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Ryuk Ransomware has flooded US hospitals, threatening to shut down their operations when they're needed most. Ryuk now accounts for a third of all ransomware attacks in 2020, with its operators finding success while many healthcare organizations are most vulnerable. 

However, the cybersecurity community is coming together to combat this rash of attacks, combining resources to provide network defenders with alerts and intelligence to protect our healthcare institutions. 

To do our part, RiskIQ released the entirety of the infrastructure related to the Ryuk strain of ransomware collected by RiskIQ's Internet Intelligence Graph.

Recently, RiskIQ's suspicious domain classifier surfaced several Google analytics typosquatting domains. One, in particular, led RiskIQ's research team to a phishing campaign impersonating Saudi Arabian government websites.

Based on infrastructure overlap in RiskIQ's Internet Intelligence Graph, our researchers determined that the campaign is connected to a previous research report from March of 2019, which outlined a phishing campaign against the Saudi Arabian government it dubbed Bad Tidings. According to the research—and corroborated by RiskIQ's data—the Bad Tidings campaign dates as far back as 2017.

Analysis of the new infrastructure found by RiskIQ appears to be a follow-on to the Bad Tidings campaign and has been ongoing since the middle of 2019. Based on our analysis of the domain infrastructure used in this new crop of attacks, the attackers appear to be impersonating several organizations, including the Saudi ministries of the interior, foreign affairs, and labor and social development. They are also impersonating the Enjazit e-visa platform and the Absher mobile app, which allows Saudi citizens to access government services. 

Ocean Lotus, or APT32, is a now-notorious threat group active since 2014, best known for its relentless malware attacks and spy campaigns against Southeast Asian governments, dissidents, and journalists worldwide.

While investigating previously reported OceanLotus activity, RiskIQ analysts came across a unique SSL certificate associated with the espionage group's infrastructure. Unique to them, the SSL correlated with more than 70 IP addresses since 2017, a connection that earlier this month helped reporters from German Publications BR24 and Zeit Online track Ocean Lotus activity across Europe.

Further analysis of this custom certificate and its associated IP addresses led us to conclude that it is part of the infrastructure OceanLotus uses to deploy Windows-based malware. Based on RiskIQ's first observation of the SSL certificate in our Internet Intelligence Graph, which links together infrastructure across the entire web, the group has been using this certificate since at least February 27, 2020, and continues to use it today.

The Donot APT group (APT-C-35) is an espionage group that focuses its attacks on Pakistan and other South Asian government agencies. One of their hallmarks has been using customized malicious Android APKs to spy on their targets of interest and steal sensitive information. Not much has been released about the group recently, but a recent investigation by RiskIQ has uncovered large swaths of its existing and past mobile C2 infrastructure. These attackers are constantly redeveloping and redeploying tools even though their activity levels may appear to taper off.

Donot has kept mostly quiet for the past year with hardly any new open-source intelligence on them published by the security community. However, on May 31 and then again on June 1, two new malware samples linked to the group surfaced on Twitter. These samples were all RiskIQ needed to leverage our Internet Intelligence Graph to build an update around this well-known APT's most recent activity and malware distribution framework. 

In part one of 'Adventures in Cookie Land', our researchers linked a cookie to a trove of new threat activity. In part two, we see just how far we can take this single indicator.

Digital web skimming attacks continue to increase. By now, anyone running an e-commerce shop is aware of the dangers of groups like Magecart, which infect a website every 16 minutes. 

However, to truly understand these skimmer groups, you have to understand the tools of the trade. The Inter Skimmer kit is one of today's most common and widely used digital skimming solutions globally. It has been involved in some of the most high-profile magecart attacks to date, most notably Group 7's breach of the Nutribullet website. 

RiskIQ has identified more than 1,500 sites compromised by the Inter skimmer, but the data theft tool is still misunderstood by those tasked with defending their organization against it. To demystify Inter, RiskIQ tapped our unmatched body of research into Magecart and its dozens of groups, open-source intelligence (OSINT), and our global internet telemetry. 

Ocean Lotus, or APT32, is a now-notorious threat group active since 2014, best known for its relentless malware attacks and spy campaigns against Southeast Asian governments, dissidents, and journalists worldwide.

While investigating previously reported OceanLotus activity, RiskIQ analysts came across a unique SSL certificate associated with the espionage group's infrastructure. Unique to them, the SSL correlated with more than 70 IP addresses since 2017, a connection that earlier this month helped reporters from German Publications BR24 and Zeit Online track Ocean Lotus activity across Europe.

Further analysis of this custom certificate and its associated IP addresses led us to conclude that it is part of the infrastructure OceanLotus uses to deploy Windows-based malware. Based on RiskIQ's first observation of the SSL certificate in our Internet Intelligence Graph, which links together infrastructure across the entire web, the group has been using this certificate since at least February 27, 2020, and continues to use it today.

At RiskIQ, we track many different Magecart groups. We continually observe evolutions in the techniques they employ to skim card data and obfuscate the code that they use for that purpose. These skimmers are becoming increasingly capable, fulfilling a variety of functions to optimize the work of the operators that deploy them. 

On January 24th, we first became aware of a new Magecart skimmer, which we dubbed MakeFrame after its ability to make iframes for skimming payment data. We initially flagged it with our machine learning model for detecting obfuscated code. 

Since then, we have captured several different versions of the skimmer, each sporting various levels of obfuscation, from dev versions in clear code to finalized versions using encrypted obfuscation. So far, RiskIQ has observed MakeFrame on 19 different victim sites. 

In some cases, we've seen MakeFrame using compromised sites for all three of its functions—hosting the skimming code itself, loading the skimmer on other compromised websites, and exfiltrating the stolen data. There are several elements of the MakeFrame skimmer that are familiar to us, but it's this technique in particular that reminds us of Magecart Group 7.

The following is our analysis of this unique skimmer and the process we followed to attribute this skimmer to Magecart Group 7.

On Thursday, February 20th, around 3 pm GMT, criminals RiskIQ identifies as Magecart Group 8 placed a JavaScript skimmer on the international website for blender manufacturer NutriBullet, nutribullet.com. Our systems caught the cyber attack as it happened and continue to detect new developments.

After multiple attempts to contact NutriBullet and receiving no response*, RiskIQ decided to initiate the takedown of the attacker exfiltration domain with the help of AbuseCH and ShadowServer. Group 8 operators were using this domain to receive stolen credit card information, and its takedown prevented there being new victims.

On March 1st, we observed the skimmer had been removed, but on March 5th, around 7 pm GMT, the cyber attackers placed a new skimmer on the NutriBullet website. We again scrambled to get the infrastructure neutralized. Unfortunately, the criminals still have access to NutriBullet's infrastructure and can continue to replace the skimmer domain in the code to make it work again. Again on March 10th, the cyber attackers were back with another skimmer in yet another script on the NutriBullet website. Until NutriBullet acknowledges our outreach and performs a cleanup, we highly advise against making any purchases on the site as customer data is endangered.

As with all breaches, RiskIQ’s technology and researchers will continue to keep a close eye on the breach and work to take down any additional domains stood up by the criminals. 

The First Skimmer