January 14, 2021
RiskIQ's recent analysis of Magecart infrastructure has shown its massive scale and put its interconnectivity into focus. Our most recent research takes two email addresses evoking the name of one of the most prominent bulletproof hosting providers on earth and ties them to newly discovered batches of Magecart infrastructure. From there, we show how this infrastructure overlaps with previously reported Magecart activity and highlight some common Magecart operator practices that can help researchers identify skimming infrastructure.
December 16, 2020
In October, RiskIQ discovered what we believe to be a new Magecart skimmer placed on several e-commerce sites, including websites for the well-known hair treatment company Bosely and the Chicago Architecture Center (CAC), one of Chicago's largest cultural organizations. The skimmer was or has been on both these sites for several months.
RiskIQ researchers have dubbed the skimmer used in these attacks "Meyhod," after a mistyped function in the skimming code. Meyhod itself is simple compared to the Magecart skimmers we've recently analyzed, such as the new variant of the Grelos skimmer and the Ant and Cockroach skimmer. However, Meyhod is carefully crafted to blend in with victim sites' appearance and functions, indicating experienced Magecart operators wield it.
December 02, 2020
In early July 2020, RiskIQ began tracking a phishing campaign identified through our internet intelligence graph targeting colleges and universities worldwide. From July 2020 into October 2020, RiskIQ systems uncovered 20 unique targets in Australia, Afghanistan, the UK, and the USA.
All these attacks used similar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as Mabna Institute, an Iranian company that, according to the FBI, was created for illegally gaining access "to non-Iranian scientific resources through computer intrusions." Mabna Institute earned the moniker "Silent Librarian" due to its focused efforts to compromise university students and faculty by impersonating university library resources using domain shadowing to harvest credentials.
However, while RiskIQ's findings are consistent with TTPs in use by Silent Librarian, they alone are not sufficient to attribute the threat activity we've detected against these 20 universities directly to Mabna Institute. Therefore, RiskIQ has named actors identified during this research as "Shadow Academy."
October 30, 2020
Ryuk Ransomware has flooded US hospitals, threatening to shut down their operations when they're needed most. Ryuk now accounts for a third of all ransomware attacks in 2020, with its operators finding success while many healthcare organizations are most vulnerable.
However, the cybersecurity community is coming together to combat this rash of attacks, combining resources to provide network defenders with alerts and intelligence to protect our healthcare institutions.
To do our part, RiskIQ released the entirety of the infrastructure related to the Ryuk strain of ransomware collected by RiskIQ's Internet Intelligence Graph.
October 28, 2020
Recently, RiskIQ's suspicious domain classifier surfaced several Google analytics typosquatting domains. One, in particular, led RiskIQ's research team to a phishing campaign impersonating Saudi Arabian government websites.
Based on infrastructure overlap in RiskIQ's Internet Intelligence Graph, our researchers determined that the campaign is connected to a previous research report from March of 2019, which outlined a phishing campaign against the Saudi Arabian government it dubbed Bad Tidings. According to the research—and corroborated by RiskIQ's data—the Bad Tidings campaign dates as far back as 2017.
Analysis of the new infrastructure found by RiskIQ appears to be a follow-on to the Bad Tidings campaign and has been ongoing since the middle of 2019. Based on our analysis of the domain infrastructure used in this new crop of attacks, the attackers appear to be impersonating several organizations, including the Saudi ministries of the interior, foreign affairs, and labor and social development. They are also impersonating the Enjazit e-visa platform and the Absher mobile app, which allows Saudi citizens to access government services.
October 14, 2020
Ocean Lotus, or APT32, is a now-notorious threat group active since 2014, best known for its relentless malware attacks and spy campaigns against Southeast Asian governments, dissidents, and journalists worldwide.
While investigating previously reported OceanLotus activity, RiskIQ analysts came across a unique SSL certificate associated with the espionage group's infrastructure. Unique to them, the SSL correlated with more than 70 IP addresses since 2017, a connection that earlier this month helped reporters from German Publications BR24 and Zeit Online track Ocean Lotus activity across Europe.
Further analysis of this custom certificate and its associated IP addresses led us to conclude that it is part of the infrastructure OceanLotus uses to deploy Windows-based malware. Based on RiskIQ's first observation of the SSL certificate in our Internet Intelligence Graph, which links together infrastructure across the entire web, the group has been using this certificate since at least February 27, 2020, and continues to use it today.
September 30, 2020
The Donot APT group (APT-C-35) is an espionage group that focuses its attacks on Pakistan and other South Asian government agencies. One of their hallmarks has been using customized malicious Android APKs to spy on their targets of interest and steal sensitive information. Not much has been released about the group recently, but a recent investigation by RiskIQ has uncovered large swaths of its existing and past mobile C2 infrastructure. These attackers are constantly redeveloping and redeploying tools even though their activity levels may appear to taper off.
Donot has kept mostly quiet for the past year with hardly any new open-source intelligence on them published by the security community. However, on May 31 and then again on June 1, two new malware samples linked to the group surfaced on Twitter. These samples were all RiskIQ needed to leverage our Internet Intelligence Graph to build an update around this well-known APT's most recent activity and malware distribution framework.
September 17, 2020
In part one of 'Adventures in Cookie Land', our researchers linked a cookie to a trove of new threat activity. In part two, we see just how far we can take this single indicator.
September 02, 2020
Digital web skimming attacks continue to increase. By now, anyone running an e-commerce shop is aware of the dangers of groups like Magecart, which infect a website every 16 minutes.
However, to truly understand these skimmer groups, you have to understand the tools of the trade. The Inter Skimmer kit is one of today's most common and widely used digital skimming solutions globally. It has been involved in some of the most high-profile magecart attacks to date, most notably Group 7's breach of the Nutribullet website.
RiskIQ has identified more than 1,500 sites compromised by the Inter skimmer, but the data theft tool is still misunderstood by those tasked with defending their organization against it. To demystify Inter, RiskIQ tapped our unmatched body of research into Magecart and its dozens of groups, open-source intelligence (OSINT), and our global internet telemetry.