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In our article "Bulletproof Hosting Services: Investigating Media Land LLC," we examined Media Land LLC, the organization ran by cyberthreat mogul Alexander Volosovik. We delved into its hosting infrastructure and activities, including domain registration services that facilitate and enable various malicious campaigns. 

We've done further infrastructure analysis to connected our previous research on Media land activities, including our articles on the Grelos Skimmer, the Inter Skimmer, and Bulletproof hosting, to Volosovik's domain registration and fast-flux services. Fast flux is a DNS technique used to mask botnets by quickly shifting among a network of compromised hosts, which act as proxies to enable criminals to evade detection.

Here, we'll analyze Volosovik's fast-flux offering patterns as seen in RiskIQ data, using several indicators to identify additional aliases, accounts, and domains connected to Volosovik. As we surface these digital relationships, we'll be able to connect previous research from RiskIQ and other security companies to Volosovik's services, showing their prevalence across the global threat landscape. 

Bulletproof hosting (BPH) is a collection of service offerings catering to internet-based criminal activity. These businesses often operate in a grey area, attempting to appear legitimate while shielding the illegal activity they host from disruption amid abuse complaints and takedown requests. Providers often foster relationships with authorities in countries prone to corruption or otherwise unconcerned with certain types of illicit activity. 

TrendMicro summarized BPH in a great graph covering three different types of BPH providers: those using stolen/compromised assets, those with a short-term lease, and providers leveraging their own data center/co-location.

In this first post in a new series of articles, we'll focus on bulletproof hosting providers with more established infrastructure, including Media Land LLC, one of the most infamous providers in the threat landscape. Our analysis of this infrastructure surfaced thousands of domains linked to threat campaigns of all kinds, showing the ubiquity, and utility, of bulletproof hosting providers. 

The Sysrv-hello botnet is deployed on both Windows and Linux systems by exploiting multiple vulnerabilities and deployed via shell scripts. 

Like many of the threat actor tools we've covered, it continuously evolves to fit the needs of its operators and stay ahead of security researchers and law enforcement. 

Over time, there have been several slight changes in the shell scripts that install the Sysrv-hello implant on machines. There have also been incremental changes in how the executable gets deployed on host systems. In our latest threat intel analysis, RiskIQ researchers have identified one of its latest developments, including the use of drive-by downloads and two new Monero wallets. 

To truly understand the Magecart skimming groups that have become a mainstay of the e-commerce threat landscape, you have to understand the tools of the trade. The Inter Skimmer kit is one of today's most common digital skimming solutions globally. However, a hallmark of widely used skimmers is their propensity to evolve as more actors use and tweak them to suit their unique needs and purposes. 

Several different actors have used the Inter kit to steal payment data since late 2018. It affects thousands of sites and likely thousands of consumers, and RiskIQ continues to see new iterations of Inter in our Internet Intelligence Graph. One of these that should be firmly on the radar of security teams monitoring their organization's web assets is MobileInter, a modified and expanded take on Inter skimmer code that focuses exclusively on mobile users. 

With nearly three out of every four dollars spent online done via a mobile device, it's no wonder Magecart operators are looking to target this lucrative landscape. RiskIQ researchers have analyzed this newer model to determine its functionality, prevalence, and links to other skimmer activity.

DarkSide, the group behind the infamous ransomware used in the attack against Colonial Pipeline that caused a national panic and sent gas prices soaring, stated on May 13 that they were immediately ceasing operations.

DarkSide operators promised to issue decryptors for all ransomware targets and compensate for outstanding financial obligations by May 23. While news of the group's capitulation is welcomed, the danger associated with the threat actors that use its ransomware has not necessarily been neutralized. 

DarkSide operates as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), and its developers receive a share of the proceeds from its deployment by other malicious cyber actors known as affiliates. On May 11, 2021, FireEye released a Threat Intelligence report on the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used by three different Darkside affiliates they identify as UNC2465, UNC2628, and UNC2659. 

Versatile, easy to use, and widely available, TrickBot has become a favorite tool of threat actors of all skill levels and a formidable threat that security teams in all organizations should be familiar with. 

Over the last five years, TrickBot has earned a reputation as a remarkably adaptive modular malware, with its operators regularly updating its software to be more effective and potent against a wide range of targets worldwide. Over its history, TrickBot has largely been propagated through phishing and MalSpam attacks, tactics that remain prominent in TrickBot operations today.

For several years, researchers have tracked a phishing kit authored by an actor known as Shadow Z118. Unlike many traditional phishing kits designed only to steal credentials, a handful of the observed Shadow Z118 kits also steal victim identities, payment, and even verify the legitimacy of entered credit information under the false pretext of verifying a user for "security purposes." 

Shadow Z118 kits have been active since at least 2017, and Johannes B. Ullrich at SANS has analyzed it here. The kit's occasional focus on stealing a user's identity and credit information, known as 'Fullz,' sets it apart and has earned it a strong reputation as an effective solution for criminals. 

Since the kit initially appeared, there have been multiple iterations, with many actors copying the original version to create unique variants. RiskIQ's threat research team analyzed several of these variants. In most cases, the phishing pages are constructed well and have multiple steps to trick users into a false sense of security.

Fake banking apps laced with malware continue to be an effective tool for threat actors. For the Yanbian Gang, a criminal group centered in Yanbian, China, that targets organizations across Asia, it's a craft they've been improving on for over a decade. 

The Yanbian Gang has targeted South Korean Android mobile banking customers since 2013 with malicious Android apps purporting to be from major banks, namely Shinhan Savings Bank, Saemaul Geumgo, Shinhan Finance, KB Kookmin Bank, and NH Savings Bank. RiskIQ's threat research team examined some of the threat group's more recent activity in this vector to analyze their malware of choice and the large-scale hosting infrastructure they use to distribute and control it.

For more than ten years, RiskIQ has been crawling and absorbing the internet to define the web's identity and map the relationships between its infrastructure to show customers how they, and attackers targeting them, fit within it. To continue to strengthen our Internet Intelligence Graph, RiskIQ's research team has begun analyzing popular malware families' known campaigns to fingerprint trends in threat infrastructure. 

We analyzed infrastructure that likely belongs to Agent Tesla remote access trojans (RATs) to determine commonalities and identify trends that will help us detect them.