Magecart Strikes Again
Ticketmaster, British Airways, and Newegg have all been compromised. Who’s next? Read our research to see how we discovered the breaches.
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July 12, 2017, Yonathan Klijnsma
Magecart is back, and the operation is more elaborate than we thought, involving physical shipping companies with mules operating in the United States.
Credit card data is a hot commodity in the criminal underworld of the internet—stolen card data is readily available, and used to fund criminal enterprises of all kinds. But scammers, rippers, and carders aren’t the only ones in on the action—the data has to be stolen in the first place.
This stolen data can be packaged and sold as CVV dumps, on websites where transactions involving stolen credit card data take place. In a recent Krebs on Security blog post, which ties Magecart infrastructure listed in our original report to a credit card dump website known as “Trump’s Dumps,” we caught a glimpse of how those behind Magecart are monetizing their operations.
By pivoting on a domain related to known Magecart activity in RiskIQ PassiveTotal, the team found that the server behind its IP address, currently used for the injects of the Magecart script, also links to a domain for a reshipping company website falsely advertised as a freight/logistics provider, USLOGISTICEXPRESS.COM.
Fig-1 Pivoting on 184.108.40.206 in PassiveTotal
Fig-2 HTTP default virtual host on 220.127.116.11 exposes uslogisticexpress.com
If we look at this fake company name, we can find a registration of it online:
Fig-3 Company profile of “logistics provider” International Express (uslogisticexpress.com)
Via false employment ads on Russian job websites for U.S.-based job seekers, mules are recruited under the pretense of “transport agents,” tasked with receiving shipments of electronics and other goods bought with stolen credit cards to ship to an address in Eastern Europe. This technique is similar to more traditional schemes involving money mules, but rather than a direct transfer of funds, the actors behind Magecart transfer funds into higher priced goods, which can be shipped across borders without suspicion, then sold for a hefty profit.
Below is a very obvious reshipping request for U.S.-based residents to help out as mules. Both of the adverts were put up on websites advertising jobs for U.S. and Russian employees and employers:
Fig-4 English language job posting for a transport agent on Russian/American news site
Online stores remain one of the easiest ways to capture payment card data, so we don’t anticipate threats like this to go away anytime soon. A lack of overall protection on many online stores and the level of ease by which criminals may gain access to vulnerable web applications lead to successful fraud operations like Magecart, supporting our belief that attackers are attempting to capitalize on this period before additional safeguards can be enacted in the ecosystem to heavily target online stores.
Visit the Magecart Public Project in RiskIQ PassiveTotal to pivot on IOCs related to this threat.
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