January 14, 2021
RiskIQ's recent analysis of Magecart infrastructure has shown its massive scale and put its interconnectivity into focus. Our most recent research takes two email addresses evoking the name of one of the most prominent bulletproof hosting providers on earth and ties them to newly discovered batches of Magecart infrastructure. From there, we show how this infrastructure overlaps with previously reported Magecart activity and highlight some common Magecart operator practices that can help researchers identify skimming infrastructure.
April 02, 2020
At RiskIQ, we track many different Magecart groups. We continually observe evolutions in the techniques they employ to skim card data and obfuscate the code that they use for that purpose. These skimmers are becoming increasingly capable, fulfilling a variety of functions to optimize the work of the operators that deploy them.
On January 24th, we first became aware of a new Magecart skimmer, which we dubbed MakeFrame after its ability to make iframes for skimming payment data. We initially flagged it with our machine learning model for detecting obfuscated code.
Since then, we have captured several different versions of the skimmer, each sporting various levels of obfuscation, from dev versions in clear code to finalized versions using encrypted obfuscation. So far, RiskIQ has observed MakeFrame on 19 different victim sites.
In some cases, we've seen MakeFrame using compromised sites for all three of its functions—hosting the skimming code itself, loading the skimmer on other compromised websites, and exfiltrating the stolen data. There are several elements of the MakeFrame skimmer that are familiar to us, but it's this technique in particular that reminds us of Magecart Group 7.
The following is our analysis of this unique skimmer and the process we followed to attribute this skimmer to Magecart Group 7.
March 18, 2020
After multiple attempts to contact NutriBullet and receiving no response*, RiskIQ decided to initiate the takedown of the attacker exfiltration domain with the help of AbuseCH and ShadowServer. Group 8 operators were using this domain to receive stolen credit card information, and its takedown prevented there being new victims.
On March 1st, we observed the skimmer had been removed, but on March 5th, around 7 pm GMT, the cyber attackers placed a new skimmer on the NutriBullet website. We again scrambled to get the infrastructure neutralized. Unfortunately, the criminals still have access to NutriBullet's infrastructure and can continue to replace the skimmer domain in the code to make it work again. Again on March 10th, the cyber attackers were back with another skimmer in yet another script on the NutriBullet website. Until NutriBullet acknowledges our outreach and performs a cleanup, we highly advise against making any purchases on the site as customer data is endangered.
As with all breaches, RiskIQ’s technology and researchers will continue to keep a close eye on the breach and work to take down any additional domains stood up by the criminals.
The First Skimmer
Magecart Group 12’s Latest: Actors Behind Cyberattacks on Olympics Ticket Re-sellers Deftly Swapped Domains to Continue Campaign
February 07, 2020
A recent blog post by Jacob Pimental and Max Kersten highlighted Magecart activity targeting ticket re-selling websites for the 2020 Olympics and EUFA Euro 2020, olympictickets2020.com and eurotickets2020.com respectively. These sites were compromised by a skimmer using the domain opendoorcdn.com for data exfiltration. With RiskIQ data, our researchers built on the previous reporting to identify more skimming domains used by the attackers, as well as additional compromised sites. RiskIQ can also now attribute all these cyberattacks to Magecart Group 12.
The obfuscation and skimming code we observed on opendoorcdn.com matches that used by Magecart Group 12, whose skimmer and obfuscation techniques we analyzed in our blog posts, "New Year, Same Magecart: The Continuation of Web-based Supply Chain Attacks" and "Magento Attack: All Payment Platforms are Targets for Magecart Attacks." However, there are differences in the techniques employed by Group 12 in these more recent compromises, which we'll break down here.
In those blog posts, we noted that Group 12 employed base64 encoded checks against the URL looking for the word "checkout" to identify the proper page on which to load their skimmer code. This encoding masked both the check itself and the skimmer URL. Quoting from our May 1st, 2019 report:
October 04, 2019
Magecart is a rapidly growing cybercrime syndicate comprised of dozens of subgroups that specialize in cyberattacks involving digital credit card theft by skimming online payment forms. It's also fundamentally changing the way we view browser security.
A global phenomenon, Magecart is threatening the ability of consumers worldwide to shop online safely by stealthily intercepting their credit card data via their browser without the consumer or website owner's knowledge. Although it's just now getting global attention, Magecart has been active for nearly ten years—RiskIQ's earliest Magecart observation occurred on August 8th, 2010.
RiskIQ's global discovery platform gathers internet-wide telemetry that enables us to view websites as Magecart actors do; a unique perspective that provides unmatched visibility into this surging threat. In our latest report, we share the valuable insights gleaned from this telemetry data, which yields critical insight into the state of Magecart, whose skimmers have appeared over two million times, and directly breached over 18,000 hosts.
September 25, 2019
From small shops to giant household names like Newegg, Ticketmaster, and British Airways, these attacks have affected thousands of sites, and potentially millions of consumers, all without virtually anyone knowing. The most significant factor in Magecart's success is that most site owners lack visibility into the code running on their site. As a result, the average Magecart skimmer lasts over two weeks, with many lasting much longer than that.
While the onus is very squarely on businesses to protect their customers by increasing their visibility into the code running on their websites, Magecart is only growing more prevalent. In the meantime, consumers can take precautions to avoid being victimized and having their credit card information feed this criminal enterprise.
Yonathan Klijsnma, RiskIQ's Head Threat Researcher and the leading expert on Magecart, offers five tips you can take as an online shopper to stay safe.
Check the reputation
September 19, 2019
Old Magecart domains are finding new life in subsequent cyber threat campaigns, many of which are entirely unrelated to web skimming.
Here’s the catch: when these domains come back online, they retain their call-outs to malicious domains placed on breached websites by cyber attackers, which means they also retain their value to cyber threat actors. Bad guys are taking advantage of these domains coming back up for sale and purchasing them to be once again pressed into service for malicious purposes, whether that be more web skimming or for use in malvertising campaigns.
July 31, 2019
The BA breach, surfaced by RiskIQ last fall, was carried out by the crime syndicate Magecart. Most recently, a sophisticated Magecart group compromised thousands of sites with a supply chain cyber attack targeting misconfigured Amazon S3 buckets.
July 11, 2019
On May 14th, RiskIQ covered the latest mass compromise of third-party web suppliers by a Magecart group. This initial report focused on seven of these suppliers, the scripts of which were injected with skimmer code, which possibly affected several thousand websites using their services.
However, the actual scale of this campaign and the number of sites affected is much larger than previously reported. The actors behind these compromises have automated the process of compromising websites with skimmers by actively scanning for misconfigured Amazon S3 buckets. These buckets are un-secure because they are misconfigured, which allows anyone with an Amazon Web Services account to read or write content to them.
RiskIQ has been monitoring the compromise of S3 buckets since the beginning of the campaign, which started in early April 2019. We’ve been working with Amazon and affected parties to address Magecart injections and misconfigured S3 buckets as we observe them.
We wrote the following article to raise awareness around the security policies for Amazon S3 as well as web-skimming attacks in general.