



Advanced Use Case:

Humanitarian Aid Group Investigation

Scenario:

You are a freelancing human rights cybersecurity analyst. You have been contacted by a humanitarian aid group that claims they were attacked and need your help with conducting the cyber investigation. You have been given some background information and a twitter post to begin your investigation.

Background:

Venezuela is currently in the throes of a major political crisis as opposition leader and self-declared interim President Juan Guaidó is attempting to oust the incumbent President, Nicolas Maduro, who had been re-elected for a second term in a very controversial election that many are refusing to recognize as legitimate.

Back in February, shortly after declaring himself as interim president, Guaidó called for citizens of Venezuela to volunteer in helping international organizations deliver humanitarian aid to the country because Maduro was refusing to accept aid and blocking desperately needed supplies, food, and medicine at their borders.

A website was set up where volunteers could register to help, which required them to provide personal information such as their name, phone number, address, and whether they have things like a medical degree or a car.

This website appeared online on February 6th. Only a few days later, on February 11th, the day after the public announcement of the initiative, another almost identical website appeared with a very similar domain name and structure.

Only people inside Venezuela seemed to be affected by this attack.

Twitter posts started to be released of an identical fraudulent website. Here is a screenshot of the twitter posts.

Twitter Post:

Jesus Lara @phenobarbital · 12 feb. 2019

En respuesta a @phenobarbital

Podría ser un "fake más", de alguna persona tratando de capturar datos, pero ...

En algunos nodos de CANTV si el usuario intenta llegar a la página oficial, es enviado a:

traceroute to voluntariosxvenezuela.com (159.65.65.194), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets

Voluntarios x Venezuela

Todos los venezolanos que queremos formar parte del movimiento de apoyo a las redes existentes, como organismos

voluntariosxvenezuela.com

Mobile Browser View 1 (5:51):

URL: voluntariosxvenezuela.com

La red de voluntarios de la

AYUDA HUMANITARIA

ÚNETE AL VOLUNTARIADO
INFORMATE E INFORMA
SÚMAMOS A PROFESIONALES DE LA SALUD

SABER MAS

SÉ VOLUNTARIO

Nombre: _____

Apellido: _____

Cédula de Identidad: _____

Teléfono celular: _____

1 commentaire 1 partage

J'aime Commenter Partager

Mobile Browser View 2 (5:50):

URL: voluntariosxvenezuela.com

La red de voluntarios de la

AYUDA HUMANITARIA

ÚNETE AL VOLUNTARIADO
INFORMATE E INFORMA
SÚMAMOS A PROFESIONALES DE LA SALUD

SABER MAS

SÉ VOLUNTARIO

Nombre: _____

Apellido: _____

Cédula de Identidad: _____

Teléfono celular: _____

Technical Details:

IP: 159.65.65.194

ASN: 14061

ISP: Digital Ocean

Organization: Digital Ocean

Services: None detected

Type: Corporate

Assignment: Static IP

Blacklist: Click to Check Blacklist Status

Continent: North America

Country: United States

State/Region: California

City: Santa Clara

Latitude: 37.3483 (37° 20' 53.88" N)

Longitude: -122.3476 (122° 20' 51.36" W)

Postal Code: 95050


Reported fraudulent website Voluntariovenezuela[.]com, 159[.]65[.]65[.]194,

The legitimate website is [www\[.\]voluntariosxvenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com).

It was reported soon after that website went up that only people in Venezuela trying to visit the original website [www\[.\]voluntariosxvenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com) was being redirected to the fake website [www\[.\] voluntariosvenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariosvenezuela.com) via DNS spoofing.

DNS spoofing, which is a type of attack that corrupts domain name servers to redirect internet traffic from legitimate servers to malicious ones.

Below are screenshots from the two websites. The one that is underlined in red in the browser address bar is the reported fraudulent website.



Goal:

Your goal is to investigate both websites from back in February 2019 and determine the following and provide your evidence:

1. Is [www\[.\]voluntariovenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariovenezuela.com) fraudulent?
2. Are any other websites also infringing on the real website [www\[.\]voluntariosxvenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com)?
3. Can you determine or infer who is behind this domain infringing DNS poison attack?
4. Are there any other websites that the threat actor is currently using or has used in attacks?
5. What are some ways people can protect against DNS spoofing?


Search:

Fist Search: Perform a search for [www\[.\]voluntariosxvenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com)
<https://community.riskiq.com/search/www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com>

Second Search: Perform a search for [www\[.\]voluntariovenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariovenezuela.com)
<https://community.riskiq.com/search/www.voluntariovenezuela.com>

Step 1: search for www[.]voluntariosxvenezuela[.]com


<https://community.riskiq.com/search/www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com>



Determine the characteristics of the real website **www[.]voluntariosxvenezuela[.]com**

From the resolutions tab, we can see the IP addresses are from Amazon.com, Inc. according to the ASN number based in the United States.

Step 2: Click on the WHOIS tab




In the change history section on the left side of the screen click on the earliest date.

The WHOIS information shows the website was originally registered to Delcos Group in the city of Maracaibo in Venezuela. The registrant is Sigerist Rodriguez.

Step 3: Click on the Certificate tab

In order to see the results that occurred back in February, you will need to use the timebar. Click on the far left side of the timebar.




The results will now refresh and display six months of data starting on February 3, 2019.

SHA-1	First Seen	Last Seen	Infrastructure
2998a00310e936c01b387e31e8385b83ba99	2019-05-07	2019-08-20	35.186.223.138
Sa2cb248b0ed536f5c485d1d8668e5ac3b2c43	2019-05-07	2019-08-04	13.249.44.12 13.249.44.24 13.249.44.73 13.249.44.74 13.249.44.97 13.33.164.160 13.33.164.177 13.33.164.49 13.33.164.69 13.33.87.74 ...7 more

Certificates are a combination of paid Amazon and Let's Encrypt free certificates. The DNS spoofing could have tainted the results because the domain was redirecting to fraudulent infrastructure. Until the other domain has been examined, we will not be able to conclusively determine if the real domain also had free Let's Encrypt SSL certificates.

Step 4: Click on the Subdomains Tab



Subdomains are not showing anything unusual and are all part of the same domain voluntariosxvenezuela[.]com

Step 5: Click on the Host Pairs tab

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ search results for the domain **www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com**, specifically the "HOST PAIRS" tab. The table displays a list of host pairs, including the parent hostname, child hostname, first and last seen dates, and the cause of the relationship. The table is sorted by "Last Seen" in descending order.

Parent Hostname	Child Hostname	First	Last	Cause	Tags
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-17	2019-07-12	parentPage	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	www.facebook.com	2019-02-17	2019-07-12	parentPage	
netblocks.org	www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-20	2019-06-10	img.src	
netblocks.org	www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-30	2019-04-30	unknown	
www.youtube.com	www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	unknown	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	system.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	script.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	www.gstatic.com	2019-04-10	2019-04-15	script.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	www.google.com	2019-04-10	2019-04-15	script.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	system.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-10	2019-04-15	link.href	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	usa.fontawesome.com	2019-04-10	2019-04-15	script.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	www.youtube.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	iframe.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	code.jquery.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	script.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	connect.facebook.net	2019-02-13	2019-04-15	script.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	ssl.google-analytics.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	script.src	
t.co	www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	location.refresh	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	www.google-analytics.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-10	script.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	www.googletagmanager.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-10	script.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	fonts.googleapis.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-06	link.href	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-06	link.href	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com	2019-02-17	2019-03-29	parentPage	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	fonts.googleapis.com	2019-02-17	2019-03-29	parentPage	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	instawidget.net	2019-02-10	2019-02-23	iframe.src	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	instawidget.net	2019-02-10	2019-02-23	unknown	

The Host Pairs tab does not show any current or past relationship with content going to or coming from the fraudulent website under investigation. Sometimes threat actors will create their website, and have it pull content directly from the real website. In this particular case, we do not see any of that type of activity on **www[.]voluntariosxvenezuela[.]com**.

Step 6: Click on the Components tab

Hostname	First	Last	Category	Value	Tags
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-03-27	2019-08-28	Hosting Provider	Amazon Web Services	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-07-11	2019-07-12	Service	Amazon S3	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	Server	AmazonS3	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-07-12	Tracking Pixel	Facebook Pixel	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-07-12	Ad Exchange	Facebook	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	Reverse Proxy	CloudFront	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-17	2019-07-12	CMS	WordPress	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	CDN	CloudFront	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	CDN	YouTube CDN	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-10	2019-04-15	JavaScript Library	WordPress Emoji	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-10	2019-04-15	JavaScript Library	bootstrap-select (v1.11.2)	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-10	2019-04-15	JavaScript Library	jQuery (v3.3.1)	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	Analytics Service	Google Analytics (deprecated)	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	Ad Exchange	Google	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	JavaScript Library	spin.js (v2.3.2)	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	Ad Network	Google	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	Tracking Pixel	Google Ads - DoubleClick	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-10	2019-04-15	JavaScript Library	jQuery bootstrap-select (v1.3.7)	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	CDN	jQuery CDN	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	Online Videos	YouTube	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-04-15	Tracking Pixel	Facebook	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-10	2019-04-15	JavaScript Library	bootstrap-sweetalert (v1.0)	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	Ad Exchange	Google Ads - DoubleClick	

None of the components appear to be associated with malicious activity.

Step 7: Click on the Trackers tab

Now we want to examine the tracker and cookies from `www[.]voluntariosxvenexuela[.]com` to see if the threat actor duplicated the real website's cookies and trackers into the fraudulent website.

Hostname	First	Last	Type	Value	Tags
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	GoogleAnalyticsTrackingId	ua-133772483-2	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-23	2019-07-12	FacebookPixelId	755796654778383	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	TwitterId	voluntariosve	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	FacebookId	voluntarios-	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	InstagramId	voluntariosxvenezuela	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-23	2019-07-12	FacebookId	755796654778383	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	GoogleAnalyticsAccountNumber	ua-133772483	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-06	TwitterId	voluntariosxv	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-03-29	FacebookId	728159757578782	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-03-29	FacebookPixelId	728159757578782	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-20	2019-02-20	FacebookId	313331376193815	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-20	2019-02-20	FacebookPixelId	313331376193815	

Here we see a list of trackers used to track user experience on the website. We will now pivot search on the first value for the GoogleAnalyticsTrackingId `ua-133772483-2`.

Step 8: Pivot search on the GoogleAnalyticsTrackingId value ua-133772483-2

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ search interface. The search bar contains 'www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com'. The results table lists various trackers found on the domain. A right-click context menu is open over the tracking ID 'ua-133772483-2', with the option 'Open Link in New Tab' selected.

Hostname	First	Last	Type	Value	Tags
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	GoogleAnalyticsTrackingId	ua-133772483-2	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-23	2019-07-12	FacebookPixelId	75579654779	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	TwitterId	voluntariosxv	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	FacebookId	voluntariosxv	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	InstagramId	voluntariosxv	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-23	2019-07-12	FacebookId	75579654779	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	GoogleAnalyticsAccountNumber	ua-133772483	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-06	TwitterId	voluntariosxv	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-03-29	FacebookId	728159757579	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-03-29	FacebookPixelId	728159757579	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-20	2019-02-20	FacebookId	313331376193815	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-20	2019-02-20	FacebookPixelId	313331376193815	

Right-click on ua-133772483-2 and open it in a new tab.

The URL should be <https://community.riskiq.com/search/trackers/GoogleAnalyticsTrackingId/ua-133772483-2>
We now see some interesting results.

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ search interface with the search bar containing 'ua-133772483-2'. The results are categorized into 'Legitimate Websites' and 'Potential Fraudulent Websites'.

Hostname	First Seen	Last Seen	Tags
voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-11	2019-07-14	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-07-12	
voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	
voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-14	2019-02-14	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-14	2019-02-14	

voluntariosxvenexuela[.]com and www[.]voluntariosxvenexuela[.]com is using Google Analytics Tracking Id as expected. But four different websites now appear to be using the same Google Analytics tracking id.

voluntariosxxvenzuela[.]com, www[.]voluntariosxxvenzuela[.]com, voluntariovenezuela[.]com, and www.voluntariovenezuela[.]com

Step 9: Now go back to the previous tab for [www\[.\]voluntariosxvenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com) and click on the cookies tab

<https://community.riskiq.com/search/www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com>

Hostname	First	Last	Name	Domain	Tags
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	remote_sid	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	VISITOR_INFO_LIVE	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	test_cookie	doubleclick.net	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmc	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmv	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmc	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmt	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	YSC	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-04-15	_fbp	.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	GPS	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	mtc	l.co	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-04-15	fr	facebook.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utma	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmb	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	PREF	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-10	_ga	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-10	_gat_gtag_UA_133772483_2	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-04-06	PREF	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-06	IDE	doubleclick.net	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-02-23	ci_session	instawidget.net	

Here we see just one cookie name that appears to be unique associated with legitimate domain voluntariosxvenezuela[.]com.

Step 10: Pivot search on the cookie name `_gat_gtag_UA_133772483_2`

Hostname	First	Last	Name	Domain	Tags
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	remote_sid	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	VISITOR_INFO_LIVE	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	test_cookie	doubleclick.net	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmc	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmv	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmc	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmt	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	YSC	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-04-15	_fbp	.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	GPS	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	mtc	l.co	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-04-15	fr	facebook.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utma	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-04-15	2019-04-15	__utmb	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-15	PREF	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-10	_ga	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-10	_gat_gtag_UA_133772483_2	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-13	2019-04-06	PREF	youtube.com	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-06	IDE	doubleclick.net	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-02-23	ci_session	instawidget.net	

Right-click on the cookie name `_gat_gtag_UA_133772483_2` and open the link in a new tab.

https://community.riskiq.com/search/cookies/name/_gat_gtag_UA_133772483_2

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ community search interface. The search results are displayed in a table with columns: Hostname, Domain, First Seen, Last Seen, and Tags. The results are categorized into two groups: 'Legitimate Websites' (highlighted in green) and 'Potential Fraudulent Websites' (highlighted in red).

Hostname	Domain	First Seen	Last Seen	Tags
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-10	2019-04-10	
voluntariosxvenezuela.com	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-11	2019-04-03	
voluntariosxvenezuela.com	voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	
www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com	voluntariosxxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	
voluntariovenezuela.com	voluntariovenezuela.com	2019-02-14	2019-02-14	
www.voluntariovenezuela.com	voluntariovenezuela.com	2019-02-14	2019-02-14	

Now we see the two hosts using a cookie from the legitimate domain `voluntariosxvenezuela.com` (in green). We also see four different hostnames pointing to two different potential fraudulent domains: `voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com`, `www[.].voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com`, `voluntariovenezuela[.]com`, and [www.voluntariovenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariovenezuela[.]com). These are the same domains that were also using the legitimate domain's Google Analytics Tracking Id.

Step 11: Investigating the domains utilizing web crawl data

Now we will examine the legitimate and potential fraudulent domains to see how the websites appear now and back in February 2019.

It is important not to directly visit the websites you are investigating. The websites might contain malware, or the threat actors could be monitoring who is visiting the website. Also, the threat actor might be filtering traffic, to block traffic from the attacked domain or it could look different from the organization.

The attack happened back in February 2019 so the websites might not be up anymore. We will now do a web crawl of one of the fraudulent domains.

In a new tab go to <https://urlscan.io>

In the search field search for the domain `www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com`

The screenshot shows the urlscan.io interface. At the top, the URL `www.voluntariovenezuela.com` is entered. Below the URL, it states "We could not scan this website!" and "Error text of the first response: net::ERR_ABORTED". It lists possible reasons: "The site could not be contacted (DNS or generic network issues)", "The site uses insecure TLS (weak ciphers e.g.)", and "The site requires HTTP authentication". A "Live Screenshot Submitted URL" is shown, which is a GoDaddy domain page for \$4.99 per year. The footer of the urlscan.io page indicates it was generated on 2019-10-15 19:52:10.

This website does not seem to be infringing at this time. Now let us search for any results in the base back in February 2019.

Step 12: Using urlscan.io look for any previous crawls for the domain www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com

Click on search in the title bar and search for www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com

Search for domains, IPs, filenames, hashes, ASNs

Search results (6 / 6, sorted by date)

URL	Submitted	Size	IPs
1 URL: www.voluntariovenezuela.com	Failed 4 minutes ago	0 B	0
2 URL: www.voluntariovenezuela.com/	12 days ago	537 B	1
3 URL: www.voluntariovenezuela.com/	12 days ago	754 B	3
4 URL: www.voluntariovenezuela.com/	8 months ago	257 B	1
5 URL: securitytrails.com/domain/www.voluntariovenezuela.com/dns	8 months ago	989 KB	16
6 URL: www.voluntariovenezuela.com/	8 months ago	3 MB	91

(6 results in total, 6 shown)

Click on the last result about 8 months ago.

www.voluntariovenezuela.com

159.65.194

URL: <https://www.voluntariovenezuela.com/>

Submission: On February 13 via manual (February 13th 2019, 2:00:54 am) from VE

Summary

This website contacted 15 IPs in 2 countries across 13 domains to perform 91 HTTP transactions.

The main IP is 159.65.194, located in Dallas, United States and belongs to DIGITALOCEAN-ASN - DigitalOcean, LLC, US. The main domain is www.voluntariovenezuela.com.

TLS certificate: Issued by Let's Encrypt Authority X3 on February 11th 2019. Valid for: 3 months.

The main domain was scanned 5 times on urlscan.io

30 structurally similar pages on different IPs, domains and ASNs found

Verdict: Unknown

Google Safe Browsing: Clean (Current Verdict)

Additional live information

Domain created: February 11th 2019, 10:03:14 (UTC)

Domain registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC

Certificates: 4 TLS certs observed from 2019-02-11 to 2019-02-14

Domain & IP Information

IP/ASNs	IP Detail	(Sub)Domains	Domain Tree	Links	Certificates
42	159.65.194	14061 (DIGITALOCEAN-ASN - DigitalOcean)			
2	209.197.3.15	20446 (HIGHWINDS3 - Highwinds Network Group)			
1	2a00:1450:4001:814::200a	15169 (GOOGLE - Google LLC)			
1	2a00:1450:4001:81a::2008	15169 (GOOGLE - Google LLC)			
12	52.6.69.241	14618 (AMAZON-AES - Amazon.com)			
2	96.126.103.183	63949 (LINODE-AP Linode)			
1	205.185.208.52	20446 (HIGHWINDS3 - Highwinds Network Group)			
13	2a00:1450:4001:81f::2003	15169 (GOOGLE - Google LLC)			

Screenshot


Detected technologies

- WordPress (CMS)
- PHP (Programming Language)
- Debian (Operating System)
- MediaElement.js (Video Players)
- Apache (Web Servers)
- Yeast SEO (SEO)
- Font Awesome (Font Scripts)
- Google Analytics (Analytics)
- Google Font API (Font Scripts)
- Google Tag Manager (Tag Managers)
- SweetAlert (JavaScript Libraries)
- jQuery (JavaScript Libraries)
- reCAPTCHA (Captchas)


Stats

91 Requests, 8 Ad-blocked, 0 Malicious, 100% HTTPS, 53% IPv6

Here we see that the domain www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com was infringing on the real domain www[.]voluntariosxvenezuela[.]com.



If you click on the Links section.



You can see that the fake [www.\[.\]voluntariovenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariovenezuela.com) domain is linking to the real domain [voluntariosxvenezuela](https://www.twitter.com/VoluntariosVe/) twitter, [instragram](https://www.instagram.com/VoluntariosXVenezuela/), and [facebook](https://www.facebook.com/Voluntarios-x-Venezuela-236037707347375/) accounts.

Step 13: Using urlscan.io for the domain www[.]voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com

Do a public scan for www[.]voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com

The screenshot shows the urlscan.io homepage. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for Home, Search, API, Live, About, and Login. A search bar contains the URL 'www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com'. Below the search bar, there are buttons for 'Public Scan' and 'Options'. A table titled 'Recent scans' lists various URLs and their scan details. At the bottom, there's a footer with 'Built with by Jago', 'Generated on 2019-09-03 16:49:58', and 'Terms of Service', 'Impressum', 'Sitemap'.

URL	Submitted	Size	IPs	Flags
www.supercampione.it/campioni-omaggio/home=Manuela&cognome=Gragnoli&email=mrag...	22 seconds ago	657 KB	59	9 4
fast.fonts.net/dv2/14/b0b84e4d-2164-45c7-a674-1662f19f3ba6-woff2?64419a6841096...	24 seconds ago	423 B	1	1 1
urlscan.io/screenshots/1e335edf-4b74-4e75-9fbf-1d62ff137eb.png?C7C7onts.google...	27 seconds ago	5 KB	1	1 1
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fo4x7brQE4&list=RD_Fo4x7brQE4&index=1?m=++?y?*	28 seconds ago	4 MB	105	17 2
www.evernote.com/hand/s604/client/mv?noteGuid=9aa9cf65-3fe7-4b0a-aeb6-ec8961b...	28 seconds ago	330 KB	4	3 1
00mailbox.azurewebsites.net/mailbox/cmd-login=f64232e53a5a12296f43f43622797910f...	29 seconds ago	19 KB	11	1 1
innovationroundtable.com/	29 seconds ago	8 MB	110	7 3
outlook.live.com/twa/	30 seconds ago	2 MB	48	3 4
www.govtech.com/subscribe?appCore=https://cms.erepublic.com/common/forms/ajax...	30 seconds ago	2 MB	58	28 6
innovationroundtable.com/	31 seconds ago	8 MB	110	7 3

13667151 public scans - 25488537 in total

Thanks to our sponsors

SecurityTrails Tines

Built with by Jago
Generated on 2019-09-03 16:49:58
Terms of Service
Impressum
Sitemap
Version: 2019-08-28T05:46

The screenshot shows the urlscan.io result page for the URL 'http://www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com'. The page indicates that the scan failed with the error 'net::ERR_NAME_RESOLUTION_FAILED'. It provides a list of reasons for the failure, including DNS issues, insecure TLS, and HTTP authentication. A 'Screenshot' section shows a placeholder for a failed screenshot. A 'Live Screenshot' section shows a placeholder for a failed live screenshot. At the bottom, there's a footer with 'Built with by Jago', 'Generated on 2019-09-03 16:52:47', and 'Terms of Service', 'Impressum', 'Sitemap'.

URL: http://www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com
Submission: On September 03 via manual (September 3rd 2019, 4:52:21 pm) from US

We could not scan this website!

Error text of the first response:

```
net::ERR_NAME_RESOLUTION_FAILED
```

This can happen for multiple reasons:

- The site could not be contacted (DNS or generic network issues)
- The site uses insecure TLS (weak ciphers e.g.)
- The site requires HTTP authentication

Take a look at the [JSON output](#) or the screenshot to determine a possible cause.

Screenshot: During scan

Live Screenshot Submitted URL

No Screenshot Available

Built with by Jago
Generated on 2019-09-03 16:52:47
Terms of Service
Impressum
Sitemap
Version: 2019-08-28T05:46

The results come back as failed.

Step 14: Using urlscan.io look for any previous crawls for the domain www[.]voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com (potential fraudulent domain)

Click on search in the title bar and search for www[.]voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com

Search for domains, IPs, filenames, hashes, ASNs

www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com

Search results (4 / 4, sorted by date)

URL	Submitted	Size	IPs
1 URL: www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com	Failed 3 minutes ago Via: manual	0 B	0 0 0
2 URL: www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com	Failed 35 minutes ago Via: manual	0 B	0 0 0
3 URL: www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com	Failed 35 minutes ago Via: manual	0 B	0 0 0
4 URL: www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com/ IP: 209.250.255.166 - PTR: 209.250.255.166-vcnr.com - Server: Apache/2.4.25 (Debian) GeoIP: North Bergen, NJ - AS20473 (AS-CHOOPA - Choopa, LLC, US)	6 months ago Via: manual	3 MB	92 15 2

(4 results in total, 4 shown)

In the result click on the item that did not fail over 6 months ago that has the IP address 209[.]250[.]255[.]166.

www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com

209.250.255.166

URL: https://www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com/
Submission: On February 21 via manual (February 21st 2019, 8:33:36 pm) from VE

Summary

This website contacted 15 IPs in 2 countries across 13 domains to perform 92 HTTP transactions.
The main IP is 209.250.255.166, located in North Bergen, United States and belongs to AS-CHOOPA - Choopa, LLC, US. The main domain is www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com.
TLS certificate: Issued by Let's Encrypt Authority X3 on February 19th 2019. Valid for: 3 months.

The main domain was scanned 4 times on urlscan.io

30 structurally similar pages on different IPs, domains and ASNs found

Verdict: Unknown

Google Safe Browsing: Clean (Current Verdict)

Additional live information

Domain created: February 18th 2019, 13:25:34 (UTC)
Domain registrar: NameCheap, Inc.
Certificates: 2 TLS certs observed from 2019-02-19 to 2019-02-19

Domain & IP information

IP/ASNs	IP Detail	(Sub)Domains	Domain Tree	Links	Certificates
42	209.250.255.166	20473 (AS-CHOOPA - Choopa)			
2	209.197.3.15	20446 (HIGHWINDS3 - Highwinds Network Group)			
1	2a00:1450:4001:820::200a	15169 (GOOGLE - Google LLC)			
1	2a00:1450:4001:81b::2008	15169 (GOOGLE - Google LLC)			
13	52.6.69.241	14618 (AMAZON-AES - Amazon.com)			
2	96.126.103.183	63949 (LINODE-AP Linode)			
1	205.185.208.52	20446 (HIGHWINDS3 - Highwinds Network Group)			
13	2a00:1450:4001:814::2003	15169 (GOOGLE - Google LLC)			

Screenshot

Detected technologies

- WordPress (CMS)
- PHP (Programming Language)
- Debian (Operating System)
- MediaElement.js (Video Players)
- Apache (Web Servers)
- Yeast SEO (SEO)
- Font Awesome (Font Scripts)
- Google Analytics (Analytics)
- Google Font API (Font Scripts)
- Google Tag Manager (Tag Managers)
- SweetAlert (JavaScript Libraries)
- jQuery (JavaScript Libraries)
- reCAPTCHA (Captcha)

Stats

92 Requests 8 Ad-blocked 0 Malicious 100% HTTPS 53% IPv6

<https://urlscan.io/result/f1e4a1a7-c9e7-4a47-b4ee-dc631961e1ea/>

Now we see results from a previous web crawl during the time in question. We can also see a screenshot of the website and all of the information that was captured during that scan. This domain in the past appeared to have infringed against the legitimate domain.

Step 15: Click on the links tab.

<https://urlscan.io/result/1e4a1a7-c9e7-4a47-b4ee-dc631961e1ea/#links>

The screenshot shows the urlscan.io interface for the domain **www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com**. The page displays the following information:

- URL:** <https://www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com/>
- Submission:** On February 21 via manual (February 21st 2019, 8:33:36 pm) from VE
- 6 Outgoing links:** These are links going to different origins than the main page. For each link, only the first name is shown.
 - <https://www.twitter.com/VoluntariosVe/>
 - <https://www.instagram.com/VoluntariosXVenezuela/>
 - <https://www.facebook.com/Voluntarios-x-Venezuela-236037707347375/?ti=as>
 - <https://instawidget.net/v/tag/YoSoyVoluntario>
 - <https://www.facebook.com/Voluntarios-x-Venezuela-236037707347375/>
 - <https://twitter.com/VoluntariosVe/>

The footer indicates the page was generated on 2019-09-03 16:56:22.

Here we see that this potential fraudulent domain is linking to the legitimate Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook accounts. This information was gathered when urlscan.io previously visited the domain.

Step 16: In urlscan.io search for previous results for the legitimate domain [www\[.\]voluntariosxvenezuela\[.\]com](https://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com)

Click on search in the title bar and search for [www\[.\]voluntariosxvenezuela\[.\]com](https://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com)

<https://urlscan.io/search/#www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com>

The screenshot shows the urlscan.io search results page for the query **www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com**. The search results are displayed in a table with the following columns: URL, Submitted, Size, IPs, and a home icon. The results are sorted by date.

URL	Submitted	Size	IPs	Home
1. URL: www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com/ IP: 13.35.253.46 - PTR: server-13-35-253-46.frak.r.cloudfront.net - Server: AmazonS3 GeoIP: Seattle, US - AS16509 (AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US)	3 hours ago Via: manual	7 MB	79 15 6	
2. URL: www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com/ IP: 13.35.253.123 - PTR: server-13-35-253-123.frak.r.cloudfront.net - Server: AmazonS3 GeoIP: Seattle, US - AS16509 (AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US)	7 hours ago Via: manual	7 MB	79 15 6	
3. URL: www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com/ IP: 54.230.93.129 - PTR: server-54-230-93-129.frak.r.cloudfront.net - Server: AmazonS3 GeoIP: Seattle, US - AS16509 (AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US)	6 months ago Via: manual	5 MB	97 17 2	
4. URL: www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com/ IP: 54.230.202.154 - PTR: server-54-230-202-154.frak.r.cloudfront.net - Server: AmazonS3 GeoIP: Seattle, US - AS16509 (AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US)	6 months ago Via: manual	5 MB	97 17 2	

(4 results in total, 4 shown)

The footer indicates the page was generated on 2019-09-04 00:05:31.

Click on the one with IP 54[.]230[.]122[.]154. <https://urlscan.io/result/77040696-2dd7-4635-ac3f-a5c96cbd3ff9/>

www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com

Submitted URL: <http://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com>
 Effective URL: <https://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com/>
 Submission: On February 13 via manual (February 13th 2019, 4:43:09 am) from VE

Summary

This website contacted 17 IPs in 2 countries across 14 domains to perform 97 HTTP transactions.
 The main IP is 54.230.202.154, located in Seattle, United States and belongs to AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US. The main domain is www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com.
 TLS certificate: Issued by Let's Encrypt Authority X3 on February 6th 2019. Valid for: 3 months.

The main domain was scanned 4 times on urlscan.io

12 structurally similar pages on different IPs, domains and ASNs found

Verdict: Unknown

Google Safe Browsing: **Clean** (Current Verdict)

Additional live information

Domain created: February 4th 2019, 15:30:59 (UTC)
 Domain registrar: PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com
 Certificates: 7 TLS certs observed from 2019-02-06 to 2019-02-09

Domain & IP information

IP/ASNs	IP Detail	SubDomains	Domain Tree	Links	Certificates
1	54.230.202.199	16509 (AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com)	Autonomous System		
40	54.230.202.154	16509 (AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com)			
2	209.197.3.15	20446 (HIGHWINDS3 - Highwinds Network Group)			
1	2a00:1450:4001:825::200a	15169 (GOOGLE - Google LLC)			
2	2a00:1450:4001:819::2008	15169 (GOOGLE - Google LLC)			
11	52.649.241	14618 (AMAZON-AES - Amazon.com)			
2	96.126.103.183	63949 (LINODE-AP Linode)			

Detected technologies

- WordPress (CMS)
- PHP (Programming Language)
- MediaElement.js (Video Player)
- Yeast SEO (SEO)
- Amazon S3 (Storage)
- Facebook (Widgets)
- Font Awesome (Font Scripts)
- Google Analytics (Analytics)
- Google Font API (Font Scripts)
- Google Tag Manager (Tag Manager)
- SweetAlert (JavaScript Libraries)
- jQuery (JavaScript Libraries)
- reCAPTCHA (Captchas)

Stats

97 Requests, 14 Redirects, 0 Malicious, 100% HTTPS, 56% IPv6

The legitimate and fraudulent domain screenshots appear to be identical.

Legitimate domain [www\[.\]voluntariosxvenezuela\[.\]com](http://www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com)

<https://urlscan.io/screenshots/77040696-2dd7-4635-ac3f-a5c96cbd3ff9.png>

Screenshot

Full size: <https://urlscan.io/screenshots/77040696-2dd7-4635-ac3f-a5c96cbd3ff9.png>

ESTADO ACTUAL ¿CÓMO AYUDAR? Coalicón Ayuda y Libertad Venezuela DESCARGAR EL KIT REGISTRAR

La red de voluntarios de la **AYUDA HUMANITARIA**

ÚNITE AL VOLUNTARIADO
 INFORMATE E INVOCA
 SUMAMOS A PROFESIONALES DE LA SALUD

SABER MÁS

SÉ VOLUNTARIO

Nombre: _____ Apellido: _____

Cédula de identidad: _____ Teléfono celular: _____

Correo electrónico: _____ Profesional de la salud: _____

Tiene teléfono inteligente: ☐ Tiene vehículo: ☐

País: _____ Estado: _____


Municipio: _____

☐ I'm not a robot

REGISTRAR

Emergencia Humanitaria Compigla **AYUDA PARA EL MÁS NECESITADO**
 Hay cientos de miles de venezolanos que hoy necesitan

Potential fraudulent domain [www\[.\]voluntariosxxvenezuela\[.\]com](http://www[.]voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com)
<https://urlscan.io/screenshots/f1e4a1a7-c9e7-4a47-b4ee-dc631961e1ea.png>



Now that we have determined that the potential fraudulent domain is using cookies and trackers from the real domain and appears to have an identical screenshot, we will now investigate it in PassiveTotal.

The website [www\[.\]voluntariovenezuela\[.\]com](http://www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com) was infringing on the real domain and the video showed that the DNS cache redirected their real domain to this infringing domain. This could happen because of DNS spoofing was reported and we observed it in the video .

According to Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_spoofing



DNS spoofing, also referred to as DNS cache poisoning, is a form of computer security hacking in which corrupt Domain Name System data is introduced into the DNS resolver's cache, causing the name server to return an incorrect result record, e.g. an IP address. This results in traffic being diverted to the attacker's computer (or any other computer).

That means if a person was in Venezuela and using the DNS servers in Venezuela a poison cache entry could be entered in and force users to be redirected to a fraudulent IP address. So, if the DNS server entry for [www\[.\]voluntariosxxvenezuela\[.\]com](http://www[.]voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com) was changed to point to a different IP address in the cache then all users typing in that real domain would do a lookup of the IP address in the DNS server. The DNS server would respond with the cached entry which could have been poisoned with a back IP address. This appears to be what happened from the twitter posts we were given.

Step 17: Open a new tab and go the website <https://community.riskiq.com> and search for the domain [www\[.\]voluntariovenezuela\[.\]com](https://community.riskiq.com/search/www.voluntariovenezuela.com)

<https://community.riskiq.com/search/www.voluntariovenezuela.com>

Adjust the heatmap by clicking on the beginning of the timebar in order to filter the results to show you the beginning of February 2019. The heatmap only shows 6 months of results at a time. Since we are investigating an attack that is a little over 6 months, we have to click on the beginning of the timebar to see the results we are looking for.



Step 18: Click on the WHOIS tab.

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ community search interface. The search results for **www.voluntariovenezuela.com** are displayed. The **WHOIS** tab is selected, showing a record from 2019-02-15. The record is checked by RiskIQ and expires in 4 months. The record details are as follows:

Attribute	Value
WHOIS Server	whois.godaddy.com
Registrar	GoDaddy.com, LLC
Email	voluntariovenezuela.com@domainsbyproxy.com (registrant, admin, tech)
Name	Registration Private (registrant, admin, tech)
Organization	Domains By Proxy, LLC (registrant, admin, tech)
Street	DomainsByProxy.com 14455 N. Hayden Road (registrant, admin, tech)
City	Scottsdale (registrant, admin, tech)
State	Arizona (registrant, admin, tech)
Postal	85260 (registrant, admin, tech)
Country	US (registrant, admin, tech)
Phone	14806242599 (registrant, admin, tech)
Name Servers	ns1.digitalocean.com ns2.digitalocean.com

Additional information on the right side of the record includes:

- Domain Name: VOLUNTARIOVENEZUELA.COM
- Registry Domain ID: 235984913_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
- Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com
- Registrar URL: http://www.godaddy.com
- Updated Date: 2019-02-11T18:18:03Z
- Creation Date: 2019-02-11T18:03:14Z
- Registry Expiry Date: 2020-02-11T18:03:14Z
- Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
- Registrar IANA ID: 146
- Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com
- Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: 480-624-2595
- Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp/clientDeleteProhibited
- Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited https://icann.org/epp/clientRenewProhibited
- Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp/clientTransferProhibited
- Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp/clientUpdateProhibited
- Name Server: NS1.DIGITALOCEAN.COM
- Name Server: NS2.DIGITALOCEAN.COM
- WHOIS: Unlinked
- URL of the ICANN WHOIS Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/vicf/
- >>> Last update of whois database: 2019-02-15T20:12:23Z <<<

For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://icann.org/epp

NOTICE: The expiration date displayed in this record is the date the registrar's sponsorship of the domain name registration in the registry is currently set to expire. This date does not necessarily reflect the expiration date of the domain name registrant's agreement with the sponsoring

The WHOIS information is privacy protected. No further avenues of investigation.

Step 19: Click on the subdomain tab

We only see two results for the domain. We will move on and come back to the subdomains if we need to further investigate them.

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ community search interface. The search results for **www.voluntariovenezuela.com** are displayed. The **Subdomains** tab is selected, showing a list of subdomains:

Subdomain	Host Name
voluntariovenezuela.com	voluntariovenezuela.com
www.voluntariovenezuela.com	www.voluntariovenezuela.com


The interface also shows a heatmap of resolutions and a list of filters. The filters section includes:

- HOSTNAME (2 / 2)
- voluntarioven... 1
- www.voluntari... 1
- TAG
- SYSTEM TAG

The subdomains section shows a list of subdomains with a 'Show: 25' and 'Sort: Hostname Ascending' option. The subdomains listed are:

- voluntariovenezuela.com
- www.voluntariovenezuela.com


Step 20: Click on the trackers tab



The results show that the domain is utilizing all of the trackers from real domain www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com (Google, Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook). We witnessed in the twitter video the DNS poison attack redirection only within Venezuela. We need to find out more information about the IP address that the website was utilizing during this attack.

Step 21: Open a new tab to <https://community.riskiq.com> and search for the domain www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com

<https://community.riskiq.com/search/www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com>



The WHOIS information is privacy protected.

Step 22: Click on the Certificate tab.

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ community search interface. The search results for **www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com** are displayed. The **Certificate** tab is selected, showing a list of certificates. The first certificate is highlighted, showing details such as the SHA-1 hash, Issued date (2019-02-19), Expires date (2019-05-20), Serial Number, and Common Name (www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com). The certificate is issued by Let's Encrypt.

SHA-1	First Seen	Last Seen	Infrastructure
c3f52fac74b28a67819e4646d09c3612257f	2019-02-19	2019-02-23	N/A
e71b118555c2eed1496466b4b72a9f305dab3	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	N/A

In the results, if you expand the certificate information you can see that all of the certificates were free Let's Encrypt certificates. This can sometimes be an indicator of a fraudulent domain. Threat actors usually don't like to spend money of infrastructure or certificates.

Step 23: Click on the subdomains tab.

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ community search interface. The search results for **www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com** are displayed. The **Subdomains** tab is selected, showing a list of subdomains. The first subdomain is highlighted, showing details such as the Hostname (www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com) and Tags.

Hostname	Tags
www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com	
www.voluntariosxxvenezuela.com	

We see that there is a subdomain for **www[.]voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com** and **voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com**.

Step 24: Click on the Trackers tab.

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ community search results for the domain **www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com**. The interface includes a header with the RiskIQ logo and search bar, and a sidebar with filters for Type, Hostname, and Status. The main content area displays a heatmap and a table of trackers.

HEATMAP

2019-02-24 to 2019-09-03

DATA

Resolutions: 3, WHOIS: 3, Certificate: 3, Subdomains: 2, Trackers: 6, Components: 25, Host Pairs: 10, OSINT: 2, Hashes: 1, DNS: 6, Projects: 1, Cookies: 8

TRACKERS

Show: 25, 1-6 of 6, Sort: Last Seen Descending

Hostname	First	Last	Type	Value	Tags
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	GoogleAnalyticsAccountNumber	ua-133772483	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	Twitterid	voluntariosxv	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	Facebookid	voluntariosxv	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	Instagramid	voluntariosxvenezuela	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	GoogleAnalyticsTrackingId	ua-133772483-2	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-21	2019-02-21	Twitterid	voluntariosxv	

1-6 of 6

We see the google analytics tracking ID, twitter, Facebook and Instagram ids from the legitimate domain vountariosxvenezuela[.]com

Step 25: In a new tab we will now investigate the IP address 159[.]65[.]65[.]194 that appeared in the twitter post.

<https://community.riskiq.com/search/159.65.65.194>

The screenshot shows the RiskIQ community search results for the IP address **159.65.65.194**. The interface includes a header with the RiskIQ logo and search bar, and a sidebar with filters for Domain, Unique Resolve, Status, Source, Tag, and System Tag. The main content area displays a table of resolutions.

RESOLUTIONS

Show: 25, 1-23 of 23, Sort: Last Seen Descending

Resolve	First	Last	Source	Tags
thebigabouterkanails.com	2019-04-02	2019-09-01	riskiq	
www.thebigabouterkanails.com	2019-04-02	2019-04-04	riskiq	
voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-12	2019-02-14	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
linkedin.co.ve	2018-08-07	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
twitter.web.ve	2018-08-10	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
live.web.ve	2018-08-07	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
abs.twitter.web.ve	2018-08-10	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
account.live.web.ve	2019-01-03	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	Blacklist, Phishing, Riskiq
api.twitter.info.ve	2018-09-17	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
login.live.web.ve	2018-10-05	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
m.facebook.co.ve	2018-10-19	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
mobile.twitter.info.ve	2018-09-17	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
ssl.gmail.web.ve	2018-10-19	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
facebook.co.ve	2018-08-07	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
abs.twitter.info.ve	2018-09-17	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
accounts.gmail.web.ve	2019-01-25	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
gmail.web.ve	2018-08-15	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
api.twitter.web.ve	2018-08-10	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
outlook.live.web.ve	2018-08-13	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
static.facebook.co.ve	2018-08-07	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
twitter.info.ve	2018-09-17	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	
www.voluntariosxvenezuela.com	2019-02-11	2019-02-13	kaspersky, pingly, riskiq	

If you examine the list of domains. We see many popular domains LinkedIn, Twitter, Microsoft login account[.]live, Facebook, Outlook, Gmail. But all of the domains end in .ve. That means that these domains are controlled by the TLD for the Venezuelan government. The fraudulent domain voluntariovenezuela[.]com also appears. All of these domains seem to have end all around the same time when the attack stopped on February 13, 2019.

Step 26: Click on the OSINT tab.

Click on the link for the source [www\[.\]redmarlin.ai](http://www.redmarlin.ai)

<https://www.redmarlin.ai/checkphish-venezuelan-government-phishing/>

The screenshot shows the RedMarlin website interface. The header includes the RedMarlin logo, navigation links for Technology, Products, Resources, and Company, and a 'TRY IT FREE' button. A search bar is located on the left. The main content area features a sidebar with 'Recent Articles' and a main article titled 'CheckPhish Helps Uncover Venezuelan Government's Blatant Attempts to Hack Its Own Citizens' by Shashi Prakash. The article text discusses RedMarlin's monitoring of Venezuelan government involvement in phishing and mentions a traffic spike on Feb 13. A line graph shows traffic trends from Feb 13 to Feb 14.

REDMARLIN Technology Products Resources Company TRY IT FREE

Search

Recent Articles

- 3 Lessons Learned While Tuning Hyperparameters of Deep Learning Models
- GANs in Real World - Can Bad Actors Use GANs to Beat AI?
- CheckPhish Helps Uncover Venezuelan Government's Blatant Attempts to Hack Its Own Citizens**
- Artificial Intelligence To Enforce Online Gambling Ban
- Midterm Elections: Detecting Fake News At Scale Using Deep Learning
- Equifax Data Breach: Look Out For These Suspicious Domains
- Myth Busted: Https Protects Against Phishing Attacks
- Tech Support Scams Defraud Victims Of Millions
- Monthly Top Phished Brands Report
- Newly-Registered Domains, Punycode And Passive DNS: Linking Clues For Hunting

Blog | CheckPhish Helps Uncover Venezuelan Government's Blatant Attempts to Hack Its Own Citizens
4 min read | Author: Shashi Prakash

CheckPhish Helps Uncover Venezuelan Government's Blatant Attempts to Hack Its Own Citizens

RedMarlin has been actively monitoring reports of Venezuelan Government's apparent involvement in hacking its own citizens through phishing. RedMarlin's product CheckPhish.ai has been a key element in this investigation since the very beginning, when a security researcher **Jose-Luis Rivas**, broke the story via a series of tweets. Since then, the story has been picked up several news channels like **Espacio Público** (Venezuela) and **Motherboard** (US) providing more details.

Feb 13 Feb 14

CheckPhish noticed a huge spike in traffic as soon as Jose-Luis Rivas shared his research on Twitter.

While CheckPhish gets visitors from over 150 countries a week, this traffic spike from Venezuela was so big that it ranked second in most used sessions by country, as seen in the Google Analytics

This OSINT article describes how the Venezuelan Government attempted to hack its own citizens.

Conclusion:

1. Is `www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com` fraudulent?

Yes, we determined that `www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com` is fraudulent and was infringing on the legitimate domain. Utilizing `urlscan.io` we could see the fraudulent domain had the same webpage as the legitimate domain. `PassiveTotal` exposed `www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com` was utilizing the same trackers and cookies from the legitimate domain `www[.]voluntariosxvenezuela[.]com`. Which meant it was copied from the legitimate domain. Redirections were seen only within Venezuela as demonstrated from the video posted to twitter. Use of a different DNS server not controlled by the TLD `.ve` worked correctly. This demonstrated that DNS poisoning occurred. The poisoned DNS cache pointed users within Venezuela to the fraudulent domain `www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com` at IP address `159[.]65[.]65[.]194`. This IP address hosted other domains that were solely controlled by the TLD `.ve`.

2. Are any other websites also infringing on the real website `www[.]voluntariosxvenezuela[.]com`

Yes, `www[.]voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com`, `voluntariosxxvenezuela[.]com`, `www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com`, `voluntariovenezuela[.]` were also infringing on the legitimate website.

3. Can you determine or infer who is behind this domain infringing DNS poison attack?

Since the TLD was controlled by the Venezuelan government we can highly speculate that the attack was carried out by them. Many OSINT reports concluded they were responsible for the attack against their Citizens

4. Are there any other websites that the threat actor is currently using or has used in attacks?

Below is a list of the domains that were used in the attack in February 2019. Each one could be investigated to get the full understanding of the attack.

`theblogaboutarikanails[.]com`
`www[.]theblogaboutarikanails[.]com`
`voluntariovenezuela[.]com`
`linkedin[.]co[.]ve`
`twitter[.]web[.]ve`
`live[.]web[.]ve`
`abs[.]twitter[.]web[.]ve`
`account[.]live[.]web[.]ve`
`api[.]twitter[.]info[.]ve`
`login[.]live[.]web[.]ve`
`m[.]facebook[.]co[.]ve`
`mobile[.]twitter[.]info[.]ve`

`ssl[.]gmail[.]web[.]ve`
`facebook[.]co[.]ve`
`abs[.]twitter[.]info[.]ve`
`accounts[.]gmail[.]web[.]ve`
`gmail[.]web[.]ve`
`api[.]twitter[.]web[.]ve`
`outlook[.]live[.]web[.]ve`
`static[.]facebook[.]co[.]ve`
`twitter[.]info[.]ve`
`www[.]voluntariovenezuela[.]com`
`mobile[.]twitter[.]web[.]ve`

5. What are some ways people can do to be protect against DNS spoofing?

If users manually set their DNS server to a known good DNS server this could prevent DNS poison attacks. For example, you could set your DNS servers to Google's DNS servers `8[.]8[.]8[.]8` and `8[.]8[.]4[.]4`



RiskIQ, Inc.

22 Battery Street, 10th Floor
 San Francisco, CA. 94111

✉ sales@riskiq.net

☎ 1 888.415.4447

Learn more at riskiq.com

Copyright © 2019 RiskIQ, Inc. RiskIQ, the RiskIQ logo and RiskIQ family of marks are registered trademarks or trademarks of RiskIQ, Inc. in the United States and other countries. Other trademarks mentioned herein may be trademarks of RiskIQ or other companies. 10_19